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DRAFT #3
24 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Counterintelligence

SUBJECT:

Security Committee Proposal for a
Community Security Budget

1. Action Requested: Your approval of the concept of a Community budget for security measures of broad concern, to be managed by your Security Committee, and your direction to [REDACTED] to take necessary implementing measures.

2. Background: In the 1978 restructuring of the Security Committee, you stated your wish that it serve as your focal point for all Community security matters. You endorsed the taking of bold strokes to make this Committee a unified force to upgrade and improve security.



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
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6. Recommendation: That the attached budget submission be forwarded to your Deputy for Resource Management with instructions for implementation.



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Attachments

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Attachment B

Community Security
FY 1982

The following items represent a security program for the Intelligence Community. It is intended to maintain a level of funding that will provide for a continuous program of research, development and training that, when taken in conjunction with existing department and agency programs, will provide a comprehensive understanding of feasible technical collection methods and permit the U.S. to take effective countermeasures.

Review of FY 1982 department and agency budget submissions and discussions with program managers have identified several areas that either have not been funded at all or have not been sufficiently funded to provide for an effective countermeasures program. The areas identified as requiring additional funds are:

(\$ in thousands)

1. Security of contractor computer processing of multilevel, multicompartmented data; support Interagency Telephone Laboratory analysis of computerized telephone systems and development of protective systems for

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(\$ in thousands)

them; emergency destruction of classified materials; test security alarm systems

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[redacted] evaluate secure conference rooms to ensure that they are not vulnerable to penetration by new technology; develop countermeasures equipment to detect sophisticated surveillance methods which are evolving from new technology.

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[redacted]

2. Relocate, update and expand the Community's sole technical countermeasures training facility

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[redacted]

(An alternative still being considered to moving the facility is to upgrade it at its present location. The cost would be about the same.

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[redacted]

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3. Security Committee staff travel and training.

4. Security education films and aids for Community use, and training for Community personnel engaged in adjudicating clearances.

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APPENDIX

Community Countermeasures

1. At the current time CIA as executive agent provides the U.S. Intelligence Community as a service of common concern, facilities for training in the field of technical countermeasures. This is the only facility of its kind in the U.S. Intelligence Community.

2. In order to have an effective countermeasures program for the Community it is essential that training keep abreast of current technology. As technology progresses, positive penetration techniques becomes more sophisticated and complex and consequently more difficult to detect. Esoteric devices with microminiaturized circuits, powered with long lasting sources are the new generation of devices to be expected. Further unique use of heretofore only theoretical procedures are possible due to break throughs in equipment development.

3. It is essential that the training facilities permit some research and development effort to be inherently associated to keep abreast of technical advances.

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5. In addition, a continual assessment should be made on vulnerabilities of highly sensitive areas such as communications processing centers. Those assessments must include evaluation of types of attacks that new technology shows can be successfully employed not only against communications equipment but against the office equipment used in these locations.

6. The separation of TEMPEST from technical penetration countermeasures inspections appears to be an artificial distinction that is rapidly becoming too costly to maintain in terms of both available manpower resources and equipment development and procurement. There is a growing movement toward melding these two aspects of physical security in many quarters of the Community. To further the desirable benefits of training personnel in both TEMPEST and Countermeasures, the Community's Interagency Training Center should have the capability to provide instructions in these related aspects of the technical threat.

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9. The cost of such a move, including renovation and new equipment is projected at for FY 1982.

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